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Abstract
The remarkable decline in macroeconomic volatility experienced by
the U.S. economy since the mid-80s (the so-called Great Moderation) has
been accompanied by large changes in the patterns of comovements among
output, hours and labor productivity. Those changes are re￿ ected in both
conditional and unconditional second moments as well as in the impulse
responses to identi￿ed shocks. Among other changes, our ￿ndings point
to (i) an increase in the volatility of hours relative to output, (ii) a shrink-
ing contribution of non-technology shocks to output volatility, and (iii)
a change in the cyclical response of labor productivity to those shocks.
That evidence suggests a more complex picture than that associated with
"good luck" explanations of the Great Moderation.
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A large body of empirical research has provided evidence of a substantial decline
in the volatility of most U.S. macroeconomic time series over the postwar period.
That phenomenon, which has also been experienced by other industrialized
economies, has come to be known as "the Great Moderation."1
Table 1 reminds us of the magnitude of the volatility decline associated with
the Great Moderation. It shows the standard deviation for two indicators of
economic activity, (log) GDP and (log) non-farm business output, before and
after 1984, a date which is generally viewed as the starting point of the period
of enhanced stability in the U.S. economy. We use quarterly data covering the
period 1948:I-2005:IV. Both variables are normalized by the size of the working
age population.2 We report evidence for both the ￿rst-di⁄erenced and band-
pass ￿ltered transformations of each variable.3 As shown in the Table, and for
the two variables and transformations considered, the standard deviation for the
post-84 period is less than half that corresponding to the pre-84 period. Tests
of equality of the variance across sub-periods reject that null hypothesis in all
cases with a minuscule p-value.
While there is widespread consensus among macroeconomists on the exis-
tence and rough timing of the Great Moderation, its interpretation is still con-
troversial. The various hypotheses put forward in the literature can be thought
of as falling under two broad categories. The ￿rst view, often referred to as the
"good luck" hypothesis, suggests that the greater macroeconomic stability of
the past twenty years is largely the result of smaller shocks impinging on the
economy, with structural changes having played at most a secondary role.4 A
1Early papers on the Great Moderation include those of Kim and Nelson (1999), McConell
and PØrez-Quir￿s (2000), and Blanchard and Simon (2001). A survey of the literature, as well
as a discussion of alternative interpretations, can be found in Stock and Watson (2002). Stock
and Watson (2005) and Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause (2006) present and discuss some
international evidence.
2Below we provide a detailed description of the data and its sources.
3We use the approximate band-pass ￿lter of Baxter and King (1999). Following widespread
practice, we identify the cyclical component of ￿uctuations as that corresponding to an interval
between 6 and 32 quarters.
4See, e.g., Justiniano and Primiceri (2006) and Arias, Hansen and Ohanian (2006) for
examples of papers making a case for smaller shocks as an explanation for the volatility
1second view attributes instead the reduction in aggregate volatility to changes
in the economy￿ s structure and/or in the way policy has been conducted.5
In the present paper we provide evidence on some of the changes experienced
by the U.S. economy over the postwar period and, in particular, around the time
of the volatility break associated with the Great Moderation. Our evidence is
based on (i) the observed comovements among output, hours and productivity,
(ii) the identi￿cation of the sources of those comovements, and (iii) the study of
their changes over time. The focus on those three variables is motivated by their
central role in existing theories of the business cycle and the frequent use of their
comovements in e⁄orts to sort out among competing theories.6 We believe that
such evidence can be useful in assessing the merits of alternative explanations
for the Great Moderation, including the two broad hypotheses mentioned above.
Much of the evidence reported below is based on an estimated structural vec-
tor autoregression (SVAR) with time-varying coe¢ cients and stochastic volatil-
ity, applied to (log) labor productivity and (log) hours. Following Gal￿ (1999)
we interpret variations in those variables ￿ as well as in (log) output, which is
given by their sum￿as the result of two types of shocks impinging on the econ-
omy: technology and non-technology shocks. Technology shocks are assumed
to be the source of the unit root in labor productivity; accordingly, they are
identi￿ed as the only shocks that may have a permanent e⁄ect on that variable.
Following Cogley and Sargent (2005), Primiceri (2005) and Benati and Mum-
taz (2007), our estimated model allows for time-varying coe¢ cients. The latter
feature makes it possible to uncover, in a ￿ exible way, changes over time in un-
conditional and conditional comovements, in the responses of di⁄erent variables
to each type of shock, as well as the contribution of the di⁄erent shocks to the
decline in volatility. Furthermore, as emphasized in Gambetti (2006), the use of
decline of the past two decades.
5Such explanations include better monetary policy (e.g. Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler (2000)),
improvements in inventory management (e.g. Kahn, McConnell and Perez-Quir￿s (2002)),
￿nancial innovation and better risk sharing (e.g. Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel (2006)), and
the optimal response of production and inventories policies to a decline in the persistence of
automobile sales (Ramey and Vines (2006)).
6Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Hansen and Wright (1992), and Gal￿ (1999) are ex-
amples of work in that tradition.
2time-varying coe¢ cients overcomes the potential bias caused by the presence of
signi￿cant low frequency comovements between productivity growth and hours
in postwar U.S. data, a problem ￿rst diagnosed by Fernald (2008).7
In a way consistent with the literature, we uncover a large, (seemingly)
permanent, decline in the volatility of output around the mid-80s. But the
analysis of other statistics point to a more complex picture, as implied by the
following ￿ndings:
￿ While the volatility of hours and labor productivity has also declined in
absolute terms, it has risen considerably relative to the volatility of output.
Furthermore, the timing and pattern of decline in the volatility of those
three variables display considerable di⁄erences.
￿ Several correlations display remarkable changes. In particular, the corre-
lation of hours with labor productivity has experienced a large decline,
shifting from values close to zero in the early postwar period to large neg-
ative values in more recent times. Interestingly, and as stressed in Stiroh
(2008), much of that decline appears to be concentrated in the 80s, and
tracks to a large extent the fall in output volatility. Similarly, when BP-
￿ltered data are used, the correlation of output with labor productivity
shows a substantial decline, from positive values to values close to zero.8
The size of that change is weaker (though still statistically signi￿cant)
when a ￿rst-di⁄erence transformation of the two series is used instead.
￿ According to our time-varying SVAR, the Great Moderation can be largely
explained by a sharp fall in the contribution of non-technology shocks to
the variance of output, both in absolute and relative terms. By contrast,
the contribution of technology shocks to output volatility appears to have
7Fernald (2008) makes a forceful case for the important role played by the positive low
frequency comovement between labor productivity growth and (log) hours per capita in ac-
counting for the con￿icting evidence in Gal￿ (1999) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson
(2003).
8Barnichon (2006), in work conducted independently, stresses the change in the correlation
between unemployment and labor productivity, as well as the decline in the procyclicality of
the latter variable.
3remained largely stable in absolute terms (and has thus increased in rela-
tive terms).
￿ Several conditional correlations also display large changes over the postwar
period. Most remarkably, the correlation of labor productivity with both
output and hours conditional on non-technology shocks shows a rapid
decline starting in the early 1980s and accelerating in the 1990s. Such a
decline re￿ ects the sizable changes over time in the pattern of the response
of labor productivity to non-technology shocks, as well as the smaller
relative importance of those shocks. On the other hand, the correlation of
hours with both output and labor productivity conditional on technology
shocks displays sizable medium-run ￿ uctuations, often shifting sign during
particular episodes. Thus, for instance, it rises considerably during the
second half of the 1970s (the oil shocks period) and the second half of
the 1990s (the dotcom era). Those changes mirror to a large extent the
pattern of the response of hours to technology shocks.
￿ Most of the key ￿ndings above are robust, at least qualitatively, to using an
augmented speci￿cation of our time-varying SVAR based on Fisher (2006),
which distinguishes between neutral and investment-speci￿c technology
shocks.
While our analysis, by its very nature, does not allow one to uncover the deep
structural sources behind the Great Moderation and other changes experienced
by the postwar U.S. economy, we believe it can still be helpful at ruling out some
hypotheses and shedding light on the relative merits of alternative explanations
for the Great Moderation, while imposing a minimal structure.
Thus, for instance, many of the ￿ndings listed above are clearly inconsistent
with a "strong" version of the good luck hypothesis that attributes the Great
Moderation to a (roughly) proportional decline in the variance of all relevant
shocks, for that hypothesis would imply a counterfactual stability of relative
standard deviations and unconditional correlations among macro variables.
4Our evidence is also inconsistent with a weaker version of the same hypothe-
sis, namely, one that attributes the decline in aggregate volatility to a reduction
in the variance of a subset of the relevant shocks, since that explanation cannot
account, by itself, for the changes over time in conditional second moments and
the patterns of impulse responses.9 On the other hand, the observed variation in
conditional second moments points to the existence of at least some structural
changes in￿ uencing the joint dynamics of output, hours and productivity over
the postwar period. The fact that the timing of some of those changes coincides
with the onset of the Great Moderation is, at the very least, suggestive of some
connection between the two.
In that regard, and as discussed in more detail below, our evidence is con-
sistent with either a decline in the size of non-technology shocks as well as more
e⁄ective countercyclical policies in response to those shocks. The hypothesis of a
change in policy is reinforced when the variations in the responses to technology
and non-technology shocks are considered jointly: some key features of those
changes can in principle be explained by the adoption since the early 1980s of
a monetary policy that focuses on the stabilization of in￿ ation, for that policy
would also tend to stabilize output in response to a variety of demand shocks,
while accommodating the changes in potential output resulting from technology
shocks. Furthermore, the gradual change in the response of labor productivity
to non-technology shocks (with an eventual change in the sign of that response)
is consistent with a declining importance of labor hoarding by ￿rms, possibly
as a consequence of better labor input management practices or more ￿ exible
labor markets (that make it less costly to hire and ￿re workers in response to
changes in demand).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reports esti-
mates of the standard deviations and correlations of output, hours and labor
productivity and their changes over time. Section 3 introduces the time-varying
9Of course, under a view of the business cycle in which the latter is largely driven by a
single shock￿ a view held by proponents of early RBC models￿ the distinction between the two
versions of the good luck hypothesis is meaningless.
5VAR approach used to estimate changes over time in conditional second mo-
ments and impulse responses, and presents the associated evidence. Section 4
presents the main empirical ￿ndings. Section 5 show the evidence based on
the augmented SVAR model. Section 6 discusses possible interpretations and
concludes.
2 The Labor Market and the Great Moderation:
Basic Evidence
2.1 Changes in Volatilities
Table 2 summarizes the evidence on volatility changes in output, hours and labor
productivity by showing their respective standard deviations for the pre-84 and
post-84 periods, as well as the ratio between the two. On the right hand panel
we also report the corresponding standard deviation relative to output, and
the ratio of relative standard deviations between the two sub-periods. We use
quarterly data covering the sample period 1948:I-2005:IV. All variables refer
to the nonfarm business sector.10 Again, we report estimates for both ￿rst-
di⁄erenced and BP-￿ltered data, after taking natural logarithms.
Turning to the main ￿ndings, we see that independently of the transforma-
tion used, all three variables considered have experienced a large (and highly
signi￿cant) reduction in their volatility in the post-84 period. The size of that
decline is, however, not proportional. Thus, the percent decline in the standard
deviations of hours and labor productivity is not as large as that experienced by
output, as re￿ ected in the increase in their relative standard deviations shown
in the last three columns of the table. That increase in the relative volatility of
hours and productivity is our ￿rst piece of evidence pointing to the presence of
changes beyond those that would result from a mere proportional scaling down
10We obtained our raw data from the USECON data base. The time series used include
output in the nonfarm business sector (LXBO) and hours of all persons in nonfarm business
(LXBH). Both variables were normalized by the civilian non-institutional population of 16
years and over (LNN). Labor productivity was computed as a the ratio between the output
and hours measures mentioned above. The GDP measure used in table 1 was drawn from the
same database, with the mnemonic GDPH.
6of volatility in all variables.
2.2 Changes in Comovements
Next we turn to the examination of the comovements among labor market vari-
ables and their changes over time. For each pair of variables considered, Table
3 reports their estimated correlation in the pre-84 and post-84 sample periods,
as well as the di⁄erence between the two. As above, evidence is reported for
two di⁄erent transformations of the data, the ￿rst-di⁄erenced and BP-￿ltered
logarithms of the original variables.
As the statistics shown in Table 3 make clear, many of the estimated changes
in comovements are large and highly signi￿cant. In particular, the cyclical be-
havior of labor productivity, measured by its comovement with either output or
hours, has experienced a considerable decline. Thus, when we use output as the
cyclical indicator of reference and the BP-￿lter as a detrending method, labor
productivity becomes an (essentially) acyclical variable in the post-84 period.
That result is considerably weaker, however, when we use ￿rst-di⁄erenced data,
though the decline is still statistically signi￿cant. That ￿nding is of substantial
interest since the strong procyclicality of productivity was one of the empirical
cornerstones of the technology-driven view of the business cycle endorsed by
RBC theory.
When we take hours as a reference cyclical indicator, the change in the
cyclical behavior of labor productivity is even more dramatic: we see that the
behavior of labor productivity switches from being largely acyclical to being
countercyclical, with the change in correlations being highly signi￿cant, inde-
pendently of the transformation used. As emphasized by Stiroh (2008), that
decline in the covariance between labor productivity and hours can explain,
from an accounting point of view, a substantial fraction of the decline in output
volatility.
Overall we view that variation in the pattern of correlations and relative
standard deviations across sample periods as evidence against a strong version
7of the good luck hypothesis, and re￿ ecting instead changes in either the compo-
sition of shocks or in the structure and transmission mechanisms operating in
the U.S. economy. In the remainder of the paper we try to enrich the evidence
presented above along two dimensions. First, we use a ￿ exible econometric
framework that allows for continuous variations in the joint dynamics of labor
market variables. This allows us to contrast the timing of changes in those dy-
namics with that of the Great Moderation. Secondly, we identify the role played
by shocks of di⁄erent nature as a source of those changes.
3 A VAR Model with Time-Varying Coe¢ cients
and Stochastic Volatility
The present section describes our baseline empirical model, which consists of an
SVAR with time-varying coe¢ cients. Though focusing on di⁄erent variables,
the speci￿cation of the reduced form time-varying VAR follows closely that in
Primiceri (2005). Our identi￿cation of the structural shocks follows that in Gal￿
(1999).
Let yt and nt denote, respectively, (log) output and (log) hours, both in per
capita terms. We de￿ne xt ￿ [￿(yt￿nt);nt], and assume that the joint process
for (log) labor productivity and (log, per capita) hours admits a time-varying
VAR representation given by
xt = A0;t + A1;t xt￿1 + A2;t xt￿2 + ::: + Ap;t xt￿p + ut (1)
where A0;t is a vector of time-varying intercepts, and Ai;t, i = 1;:::;p, are
matrices of time-varying coe¢ cients.11 We assume that all the roots of the
VAR polynomial lie outside the unit circle for all t; i.e. the process is "locally
stationary." The sequence of innovations futg follows a Gaussian white noise
process with zero mean and time-varying covariance matrix ￿t, and uncorrelated
with all lags of xt. Letting At = [A0;t;A1;t:::;Ap;t], we de￿ne ￿t = vec(A0
t)
11As stressed in Gambetti (2006), the presence of a time-varying intercept in the VAR
absorbs the low frequency comovement between ￿(yt ￿ nt) and nt, thus overcoming the
potential distortions in the estimates pointed out by Fernald (2008).
8where vec(￿) is the column stacking operator. Conditional on the roots of the
associated VAR polynomial being outside the unit circle for all t, we assume ￿t
evolves over time according to the process
￿t = ￿t￿1 + !t (2)
where !t is a Gaussian white noise process with zero mean and constant covari-
ance ￿, and independent of ut at all leads and lags.
We model the time variation for ￿t as follows. Let ￿t ￿ FtDtF0
t where Ft is
lower triangular with ones in the main diagonal and Dt a diagonal matrix.12 Let
￿t be a vector containing all the elements of F
￿1
t below the diagonal, stacked
by rows, and ￿t the vector of diagonal elements of Dt.
￿t = ￿t￿1 + ￿t (3)
log￿t = log￿t￿1 + ￿t (4)
where ￿t and ￿t are Gaussian white noise processes with zero mean and (con-
stant) covariance matrices ￿ and ￿, respectively. We assume that ￿ has a block
diagonal structure, i.e. all the covariances between coe¢ cients belonging to dif-
ferent equations are zero, and that ￿ is diagonal. Finally we assume that ￿t;￿t;
and !t are all mutually independent.
We assume that the vector of VAR innovations ut is a (time-varying) linear
transformation of the vector of underlying "structural" shocks "t ￿ ["a
t;"d
t]0,
satisfying Ef"t"0
tg = I for all t, where "a
t represents a technology shock and
"d
t is a non-technology shock (which occasionally refer to for convenience as a
"demand" shock). Thus we assume ut = Kt "t for all t for some non-singular
matrix Kt satisfying KtK0
t = ￿t. Note that, given our normalization, changes
in the contribution of di⁄erent structural shocks to the volatility of innovations
in output, hours or productivity will be captured by changes in Kt.
Our identi￿cation of structural shocks follows Gal￿ (1999), by assuming that
only technology shocks may a⁄ect labor productivity in the long-run. As we
12Cogley and Sargent (2005) adopt a more restrictive speci￿cation of the time-varying VAR,
characterized by a constant matrix F. That assumption imposes some restrictions on the
evolution of ￿t that are absent here.
9will see next, that assumption imposes some restrictions that allow us to recover
matrix Kt from our estimated reduced form model (1).
Before we proceed it is convenient to rewrite (1) in companion form:
xt = ￿t + At xt￿1 + ut
where xt ￿ [x0
t;x0
t￿1;:::;x0
t￿p+1]0, ut ￿ [u0
t;0;:::;0]0; ￿t ￿ [A0
0;t;0;:::;0]0 and At
is the corresponding companion matrix. We use a local approximation of the
implied response at t + k of (log) labor productivity growth and (log) hours to
a realization of the innovation vector in period t. Formally, that local response
is given by
@xt+k
@u0
t
= E2;2 A
k
t ￿ Bt;k
for k = 1;2;::: where E2;2(M) is a function which selects the ￿rst 2 rows and
2 columns of any matrix M, and where Bt;0 ￿ I. Thus, the k￿period horizon
impulse responses of labor productivity growth and hours to structural shocks
hitting the economy at time t are given by
@xt+k
@"0
t
=
@xt+k
@u0
t
@ut
@"0
t
= Bt;k Kt ￿ Ct;k
for k = 0;1;2;::: Notice that in contrast with the ￿xed-coe¢ cient model, the
impulse response of a variable to a shock at any given horizon may vary over
time.
Let e Bt;k ￿
Pk
j=0 Bt;j and e Ct;k ￿
Pk
j=0 Ct;j . The assumed absence of a long
run e⁄ect of non-technology shocks on the level of labor productivity implies
that the matrix of long-run cumulative multipliers e Ct;1 ￿ e Bt;1Kt is lower
triangular. This, combined with the fact that KtK0
t = ￿t , yields
e Ct;1 e C0
t;1 = e B0
t;1￿t e B0
t;1
which in turn allows us to determine (up to column sign) e Ct;1 as the Cholesky
factor of e B0
t;1￿t e B0
t;1. Given e Ct;1, the structural impulse responses of shocks
occurring at time t can be obtained using
@xt+k
@"0
t
= Bt;k e B
￿1
t;1 e Ct;1
10for k = 0;1;2;::: which is a function of parameters describing the reduced form
time-varying VAR (1) only. We refer the reader to Appendix 1 for a detailed
description of the method used to estimate that model, which follows Primiceri
(2005).
Our analysis below focuses on the second moments (conditional and uncon-
ditional) of the growth rates of output (￿yt), labor productivity (￿(yt ￿ nt) ￿
￿qt), and hours (￿nt). Our model allows us to write each of those variables as
a time-varying distributed lag of the two structural disturbances. Thus, letting
xi;t represent one of those variables we have
xi;t = ￿i
t +
1 X
k=0
Cia
t;k "a
t￿k +
1 X
k=0
Cid
t;k "d
t￿k
Given estimates of the coe¢ cients of such distributed lags, we can construct
time-varying measures of unconditional and conditional second moments of the
three variables under consideration. Thus, for instance, the unconditional vari-
ance at time t of variable xi;t is given by
var(xi;t) =
1 X
k=0
(Cia
t;k)2 +
1 X
k=0
(Cid
t;k)2
where the two terms on the right hand side represent the contribution of each of
the shocks to that variance (or, equivalently, the variances conditional on each
of the shocks).
Similarly, the covariance at time t between xi;t and xj;t is given by
cov(xi;t;xj;t) =
1 X
k=0
Cia
t;kC
ja
t;k +
1 X
k=0
Cid
t;kC
jd
t;k
with each of the terms on the right hand side representing the covariances at
time t conditional on technology and non-technology shocks, respectively. Time-
varying conditional and unconditional correlations can then be computed in a
straightforward way, using the above information.
In the next section we report estimates for a number of such time-varying
second moments and analyze the timing of their changes, relative to that of the
Great Moderation.
114 Changing Labor Market Dynamics and the
Great Moderation
4.1 Unconditional Second Moments
Next we report some unconditional second moments implied by our estimated
time-varying VAR. Figure 1a displays the evolution over time of the uncondi-
tional standard deviation of output, hours and labor productivity (all in log
￿rst-di⁄erences).13 The observed pattern for output volatility is consistent with
the existing evidence on the Great Moderation: its standard deviation experi-
ences a remarkable decline between 1980 and 1986, stabilizing after that date at
a level below that of the 1960s. Before that transition the estimated volatility
is far from constant, experiencing instead a substantial increase in the mid and
late 1970s.14 A similar pattern, at least qualitatively, is observed for the stan-
dard deviation of hours, though for the latter variable the hump in the 1970s
is relatively more pronounced than the overall decline in volatility. Finally, and
by way of contrast, we see that the volatility of labor productivity declines very
gradually over the postwar period, without showing any abrupt changes around
the onset of the Great Moderation.
Figure 1b complements the previous evidence by showing the evolution of
the relative standard deviations of hours and labor productivity, taking the
volatility of output as a benchmark. In a way consistent with the evidence in
Table 2 discussed above, we observe an upward trend in both measures of relative
volatility. In the case of labor productivity, the observed pattern is the mirror
image of that seen in the standard deviation of output, thus showing a large
increase in the early 1980s, coinciding with the onset of the Great Moderation.
On the other hand, the (smaller) ￿ uctuations around an upward trend in the
relative standard deviation of hours do not display any obvious pattern that one
could relate to the Great Moderation or any other event.
13Here and in subsequent ￿gures we report statistics starting in 1962:I, since the earlier
sample is needed for the purpose of calibration of priors￿parameters. Unless noted otherwise
the value reported corresponds to the median of the posterior distribution of the statistic of
interest, at each point in time.
14A similar observation is made in Blanchard and Simon (2001).
12Figure 2 displays the evolution of the unconditional (pairwise) correlations
among output, hours and labor productivity, measured by the left-hand scale.
As a reference, the ￿gure also shows the time-varying standard deviation of
output (measured by the right-hand scale). The ￿gure con￿rms the decline
(and change of sign) in the hours-labor productivity correlation (dash-dotted
line) already uncovered in Table 3, now making clear that the bulk of that
decline takes place in the early 1980s, thus coinciding in its timing with the
onset of the Great Moderation. Before that turning point, the correlation show
a gradual increase.15 A similar pattern, though less pronounced, can be observed
in the hours-output correlation.
We view the ￿ndings above as prima facie evidence against a strong version
of the good luck hypothesis for, as argued in the introduction, the latter would
predict a scaling down of ￿ uctuations in all variables without a corresponding
change in their correlations. The evidence so far, however, does not allow us
to determine whether those changes re￿ ect a mere composition e⁄ect (result-
ing from variations in the relative importance of di⁄erent types of shocks) or
whether, instead, there has been a genuine change in the economy￿ s response to
each kind of shock. In order to address that question we turn to the analysis of
the estimated conditional moments.
4.2 Conditional Volatilities: What Shocks are Responsi-
ble for the Great Moderation?
We start by examining the sources of the changes in the standard deviation
of output, hours and labor productivity over time (all in log ￿rst-di⁄erences).
Figures 3a through 3c plot the estimates of the (time-varying) standard de-
viations of each of those variables conditional on technology (dashed line) and
non-technology shocks (dotted line), as implied by our estimated SVAR. In each
case, and as reference, we also plot the unconditional standard deviation (solid
line).
15That observation con￿rms a key ￿nding in Stiroh (2008), even though our statistical
approaches are di⁄erent (we use a time-varying VAR vs rolling correlations in Stiroh (2008)).
13The pattern that emerges in Figure 3a is unambiguous: the Great Moder-
ation can be largely accounted for by the decline in the contribution of non-
technology shocks to the variance of output. In particular, the timing and
magnitude of the fall in the conditional standard deviation of output, between
1980 and 1985, matches well that of its unconditional standard deviation. On
the other hand, the contribution of technology shocks to output volatility, ap-
pears to have been much more stable over the postwar period, with a small
decline in the early 1980s followed by an (equally small) increase over the past
two decades. It is interesting to note that, starting from a dominant role of
non-technology shocks in the early 60s, the di⁄erent trends in the conditional
volatilities mentioned above have implied a gradual convergence in the contri-
bution of both shocks, with their weights being essentially the same at the end
of the sample.
Figure 3b reports analogous evidence for hours. As in the case of output,
changes in the contribution of non-technology shocks explain the bulk of the
pattern in the standard deviation of hours, including its rise in the 1970s and
the subsequent fall in the 1980s. The contribution of technology shocks is much
smaller, and appears to display a slight downward trend.
The previous two ￿gures have shown that technology shocks have had, at
least until recently, a relatively small role as a source of ￿ uctuations in U.S.
output. In the case of hours a similar ￿nding holds for the entire postwar
period. Figure 3c makes clear that this is not the case for labor productivity:
￿ uctuations in the latter are largely accounted for by technology shocks. Yet,
the ￿gure also makes clear that non-technology shocks are responsible for the
secular decline over the postwar period in the volatility of labor productivity.
Interestingly, the decline in the contribution of non-technology shocks to that
volatility is seen to start in the mid 1970s, well before the onset of the Great
Moderation period.
Tables 4 allows us to examine the sources of the observed changes in volatili-
ties from a di⁄erent perspective. It reports the (conditional) standard deviations
14of the estimated technology and non-technology components of output, hours
and labor productivity, for both the pre-84 and post-84 sample periods. In
contrast with the evidence reported in Figures 3a-3c, the statistics reported
in Tables 4 depend not only on the estimated moving average coe¢ cients (the
C
ij
t;k￿ s of section 3) but also on the speci￿c realizations of the structural shocks
in each sample period. As we did for the original data (see Table 2), we report
statistics for both the ￿rst-di⁄erenced and BP-￿ltered transformations of each
of those components and test for the signi￿cance of the estimated changes across
the two subsamples.16 The statistics in Table 4 point to the following ￿ndings
uncovered by our analysis. First, non-technology shocks appear to be the main
source of the decline in the volatility of output and labor productivity. Second,
although both shocks contribute to the drop in the volatility of hours, the larger
share of that decline (and the only one signi￿cant at the 5 percent level) is that
associated with technology shocks.
An important caveat must be raised at this point: our analysis so far cannot
identify whether the changes in conditional volatilities are the result of changes
in the variance of the underlying structural shocks ("good luck") or, alterna-
tively, of a di⁄erent impact of a shock of a given size on the variable considered,
which could be the result of a change in the systematic policy response to that
shock or of other structural changes. Thus, for instance, the lower contribu-
tion of non-technology shocks in the more recent period could be due either to
smaller demand disturbances or to a stronger countercyclical policy in response
to those shocks (or both, of course). The evidence on conditional correlations
provided below, however, is inconsistent with an explanation based exclusively
on changes in the variance of some of the underlying structural shocks.
The previous caveat notwithstanding, the evidence shown in Figures 3a-3c
is clearly at odds with the hypothesis of a declining contribution of technology
shocks to output variability put forward in Arias, Hansen and Ohanian (2006;
16We should note that the tests reported in Tables 4 and 5 treat the estimates of the C
ij
t;k
coe¢ cients as the "true" coe¢ cients, i.e. they do not take into account the sampling error
associated with the estimation. Thus, they should just be viewed as a quantitative summary
of the estimated changes in conditional second moments.
15AHO henceforth), and which is claimed by the latter authors to fully account
for the decline in the cyclical volatility of output. To be more speci￿c, those
authors show that the standard deviation of measured total factor productivity
(TFP) has declined by a factor of about 1/2 between the pre-84 and post-84
periods. As shown by AHO, when two alternative calibrations of the technology
process consistent with that observation are considered, an RBC model predicts
a decline in the volatilities of output and its components similar to those ob-
served in the data. The empirical evidence presented here shows no sign of a
decline in the contribution of technology shocks to output volatility that could
account for the Great Moderation, and hence calls into question the conclusions
of AHO￿ s analysis.
4.3 Conditional Correlations and Structural Change
In Figures 4a through 4c we display the evolution of the conditional correlations
between output and hours (Figure 4a), labor productivity and hours (Figure
4b), and labor productivity and output (Figure 4c). Correlations conditional
on technology (non-technology) shocks are represented by the dashed (dotted)
line, while the solid line represents the unconditional correlation. In order to
interpret the subsequent evidence it is worth noting the relationship linking the
unconditional and conditional correlations between two generic variables x and
z:
corr(xt;zt) = ￿a corra(xt;zt) + ￿d corrd(xt;zt)
where ￿i ￿
￿i(xt)
￿(xt)
￿i(zt)
￿(zt) and where corri(xt;zt) and ￿i(zt) denote, respectively,
the correlation and standard deviation conditional on i-shocks, for i = a;d. Note
that the weight given to each conditional correlation in the above expression
is proportional to the geometric average of the shares of the corresponding
conditional variances in the unconditional variance of each variable. As a result,
that weight will be small if the associated shock accounts for a small fraction of
the variance of one of the two variables, even if it plays a large role in accounting
for the volatility of the other variable.
16As seen in Figure 4a, the strong positive correlation between output and
hours masks a more complex underlying reality: the coexistence of a stable
near-unity correlation generated by non-technology shocks (dotted line) with a
correlation that ￿ uctuates between positive and (slightly) negative values as a
result of technology shocks (dashed line). The weak correlation between out-
put and hours conditional on technology shocks is consistent with much of the
evidence uncovered by the recent literature on the macroeconomic e⁄ects of
technology shocks.17 Our approach here allows us to uncover a novel result:
the changing pattern of the output-hours correlation conditional on technol-
ogy shocks. In particular, it is worth noting the increases in that correlation
in the 1970s and in the second half of the 1990s, when it takes non-negligible
positive values (above 0.5), before returning to negative territory. Note, how-
ever, that the two surges in the conditional correlations are hardly re￿ ected in
the corresponding unconditional correlation, given the relatively small weight
of technology shocks in accounting for the total variance of hours during those
episodes (see Figure 4b).
Figure 4b reports conditional and unconditional correlations between labor
productivity and hours. The ￿gure con￿rms the large decline in their correlation
conditional on non-technology shocks (dotted line), which falls from a value of
about 0:6 in the 1960s to somewhere between ￿0:6 and ￿0:8 in more recent
years. Note, however, that the bulk of that decline occurs in the 1990s, once
the Great Moderation is well underway and after the large decline in the un-
conditional correlation. On the other hand we see that the hours-productivity
correlation conditional on technology shocks (dashed line) hovers around a value
close to ￿0:8 with the exception of two spikes: one around 1980, and a larger
spike in the second half of the 1990s. The previous ￿ndings, combined with
those in Figures 3b and 3c suggest that the large decline in the unconditional
correlation in the early 1980s is the result of a variety of factors, including a
decline in both conditional correlations and an increase in the relative impor-
tance of technology shocks, given that the latter induce a negative correlation
17See Gal￿ and Rabanal (2004) for a survey of that literature.
17between hours and labor productivity,
Finally, we show in Figure 4c the evolution of the conditional and uncon-
ditional productivity-output correlations. Note that the correlation conditional
on technology shocks (dashed line) is close to unity during much of the sample
period. This fact, combined with the dominant role of those shocks as a source of
labor productivity ￿ uctuations (see Figure 3c), explains the relative stability of
the unconditional productivity-output correlation around a high positive value.
By way of contrast, the correlation conditional on non-technology shocks (dot-
ted line) follows a rapidly declining pattern that roughly mirrors that observed
for the corresponding correlation between productivity and hours in Figure 4b.
Table 5 quanti￿es the (pairwise) conditional correlations among output,
hours and labor productivity in the pre-84 and post-84 periods. As in Table
4, we report statistics for both the ￿rst-di⁄erenced and BP-￿ltered transforma-
tions of each of those components and test for the signi￿cance of the estimated
changes across the two subsamples. The results of that exercise con￿rm that
non-technology shocks are largely responsible for the signi￿cant decline in the
correlation between labor productivity and hours on the one hand, and labor
productivity and output on the other.18
The evidence provided above suggests that at least two of the observed
changes in unconditional correlations (those involving labor productivity) de-
scribed in section 2 and earlier in the present section can be attributed to a
(large) change in conditional correlations, the ones associated with non-technology
shocks. Furthermore, and as discussed above, the timing of some of those
changes matches pretty well that of the Great Moderation. That ￿nding pro-
vides some evidence that the latter episode cannot be characterized exclusively
in terms of a decline in the volatility of one or more shock, hinting instead
(though admittedly without proving it) at a potential role for structural change.
18Note that the latter decline is (partly) o⁄set by a small, but signi￿cant, increase in the
correlation between labor productivity and output resulting from technology shocks.
184.4 Impulse Responses
Conditional volatilities and correlations summarize some dimensions of the im-
pulse responses to di⁄erent shocks. Accordingly, the changes experienced over
the postwar period in those conditional second moments must be re￿ ecting par-
allel changes in the underlying impulse responses. Next we present and brie￿ y
discuss the evolution over time of the impulse responses that can account for
three of the most signi￿cant ￿ndings uncovered above, namely, (i) the decline in
output volatility resulting from a smaller contribution of non-technology shocks,
(ii) the sign and changes over time in the conditional correlations between labor
productivity and hours.
As discussed above, the decline in output volatility initiated in the 1980s is
the result of a smaller contribution of non-technology shocks. Figure 5a displays
the evolution over time of the dynamic response of output to a non-technology
shock. More speci￿cally, the ￿gure shows the response corresponding to the
￿rst quarter of each calendar year to a unit innovation in "d
t. Given our nor-
malization, that size corresponds to a one standard deviation. Throughout the
sample period the response of output to a non-technology shock shows a char-
acteristic hump shape, and displays substantial persistence. But, as is clearly
captured by the ￿gure, the scale of the response goes down dramatically in the
early 1980s, and remains subdued from then on. The magnitude of that change
is re￿ ected more clearly in ￿gure 5b, which displays, side by side, the average
impulse responses in the pre-84 and post-84 periods. Figure 5c shows the di⁄er-
ence between those two impulse responses, together with a 68% (dashed) and
95% (dotted) con￿dence bands implied by the posterior distribution. Perhaps
not surprisingly given the nature of our empirical approach, the uncertainty
associated with the estimated impulse responses is large (as re￿ ected in the size
of the con￿dence bands). Yet, the posterior distribution strongly rejects the hy-
pothesis of no di⁄erential response over the 6 quarters subsequent to the shock
at a 5 percent signi￿cance level.
A second key ￿nding emphasized above is the decline in the cyclicality of
19labor productivity conditional on non-technology shocks. Figure 6a uncovers
the source of that change, by showing the evolution over the postwar period of
the dynamic response of labor productivity to a unit innovation in "d
t (i.e. the
same pattern of shocks responsible for the output responses shown in Figure
6a). Thus, we see that an expansionary non-technology shock has a large and
persistent positive e⁄ect on labor productivity in the early part of the sample,
an observation consistent with the evidence of so-called "short-run increasing
returns to labor" (SRIRL) uncovered by a number of economists.19 Starting in
the early 80s, however, the SRIRL phenomenon vanishes gradually: the response
of labor productivity keeps getting smaller over time until eventually switches
its sign and becomes persistently negative, as would be implied by a technology
displaying decreasing returns to labor. As shown in Figure 6b, the average
impulse responses of labor productivity over the pre-84 and post-84 periods
di⁄er considerably, with the gap between the two at the time of the shock being
signi￿cant at the 5 percent level (see Figure 6c).
Finally, we turn our attention to the response of hours to a technology shock
and its evolution over the postwar period, which is shown in Figure 7a. For
much of the sample period considered, hours display a persistent decline in re-
sponse to a positive technology shock, i.e. one that increases labor productivity
permanently (responses not shown here). That ￿nding is consistent with the
evidence in Gal￿ (1999), Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2005), and Francis and
Ramey (2005), and accounts for the negative conditional correlation between
hours and labor productivity estimated for much of the sample period (see Fig-
ure 4b). Our time-varying estimates allow us to go beyond the existing evidence
and examine the changes over time in the size and pattern of response. In that
respect we note that, some ￿ uctuations notwithstanding, the size of the negative
response of hours appears to have gone down over time (in absolute value).20
19See Gordon (1990) for a review of that literature.
20The previous ￿nding accords with the evidence, reported in Gal￿, L￿pez-Salido, and VallØs
(2003), of large and signi￿cant contractionary e⁄ects of aggregate technological improvements
on employment in the pre-Volcker period, in contrast with the small and largely insigni￿cant
short term e⁄ects over the Volcker-Greenspan period.
20This is re￿ ected in the gap between the "average" impulse responses for the pre-
and post-84 periods shown in Figure 7b, though the gradual change combined
with the large con￿dence bands associated to our time-varying impulse responses
cannot reject equality between the two average responses for any horizon at any
reasonable signi￿cance level (see Figure 7c).
Perhaps most interestingly, we note how the negative response of hours is
more muted in the late 1970s and in the second half of the 1990s (in the latter
period it even becomes positive). Those observations would seem to account for
the spikes in the pattern of hours-labor productivity correlations conditional on
technology shocks shown in Figure 4b.
4.5 Robustness: The Role of Investment-Speci￿c Technol-
ogy Shocks
In this section we extend our empirical analysis along the lines of Fisher (2006),
thus allowing for both neutral technology shocks (henceforth, N-shocks) and
investment-speci￿c technology shocks (I-shocks), in order to check the robust-
ness of our main ￿ndings. This extension is of particular interest in light of
the ￿ndings in Justiniano and Primiceri (2006) based on time-varying estimates
of a DSGE model, and which point to the smaller size of I-shocks as the main
explanation for the decline in output growth volatility.
Following Fisher (2006), we identify I-shocks as the only source of the unit
root in the relative price of investment, i.e. we restrict N-shocks and non-
technology shocks not to have a permanent e⁄ect on that variable. On the
other hand, we allow both N-shocks and I-shocks to have a long run e⁄ect on
labor productivity. Following Justiniano and Primiceri (2006) we construct a
series for the (log) real price of investment as a weighted average of the (log)
de￿ ators of nondurables and services consumption minus the weighted average
of the (log) de￿ ators for investment and durable consumption, with the weights
given by the relative (nominal) shares of each spending category.21
21The data used to construct the relative price of investment series were drawn from
the FRED-II database of the St. Louis Fed. The de￿ators are constructed as the
ratios of nominal to real expenditure in each category, using the following formulas:
21Given space limitations we focus our discussion on two key aspects of the
evidence presented above: the contribution of the di⁄erent shocks to the decline
in output volatility and their role in accounting for the change in the labor
productivity-hours correlation.
Figure 8 plots estimates of the (time-varying) standard deviation of output
growth conditional on the three types of shocks, as well as the corresponding
unconditional standard deviation. First, note that N-shocks (dashed line) have
a relatively small and stable contribution to the volatility of output throughout
the sample period, with the exception of a transitory increase around 1980.
Secondly, both I-shocks (dashed-dotted line) and non-technology shocks (dotted
line) play an important role in the Great Moderation. Interestingly, however, the
patterns of their contribution di⁄er substantially. Roughly speaking, while non-
technology shocks account for the downward trend in volatility, I-shocks (and
to a lesser extent, N-shocks) appear to be responsible for the hump observed
during the second half of the 1970s.
Our augmented model thus points to an important role of I-shocks as a
source of both the extraordinary increase in volatility of the 1970s and the
subsequent decline in the mid-1980s. On the other hand our previous ￿nding
of an important contribution of non-technology shocks to the decline in output
volatility appears to be robust to the alternative speci￿cation considered here,
though the (previously dominant) role of non-technology shocks in the abrupt
volatility decline of the early 80s is now shared to some degree with technology
shocks.
Figure 9 displays the conditional and unconditional correlations between
labor productivity and hours based on the time-varying estimates of our aug-
mented VAR. We note that a key ￿nding of our bivariate model, namely, the
decline in the hours-labor productivity correlation conditional on non-technology
shocks re-emerges here, though it appears to be less abrupt than in our bivariate
model. In fact, while that correlation declines from a value close to 0.7 to one
PCDG/PCDGCC96 (durables), PCND/PCNDGC96 (nondurables), PCESV/PCESVC96
(services) and FPI/FPIC1 (investment).
22about 0.1, it remains positive over the whole sample period. On the other hand
both types of technology shocks generate a correlation between the same two
variables that displays no strong downward trend over time, but instead shows
a hump centered around 1980, though somewhat less pronounced than the one
obtained in the bivariate model.
5 Tentative Interpretations and Caveats
The remarkable decline in macroeconomic volatility experienced by the U.S.
economy since the mid-80s (the so-called Great Moderation) has involved more
than a mere scaling down of the size of ￿ uctuations. In particular, and as
the evidence provided in the present paper makes clear, that volatility decline
has been accompanied by large changes in the patterns of comovements among
output, hours and labor productivity. Those changes are re￿ ected in both con-
ditional and unconditional second moments as well as in the impulse responses
to identi￿ed shocks.
Two of our ￿ndings appear particularly relevant and worthy of further dis-
cussion. First, the decline in output volatility appears to be the result of a
smaller contribution of non-technology shocks. Secondly, the Great Modera-
tion period has witnessed a dramatic fall (with sign switch included) in the
correlation between hours and labor productivity generated by non-technology
shocks.
The shrinking contribution of non-technology shocks to output volatility can
be due, in principle, to two non mutually exclusive developments. First, the av-
erage size of the underlying shocks may have become smaller. Secondly, the
response of output may have become more muted over time, even when con-
trolling for shock size, as a result of some structural change in the mechanisms
propagating the e⁄ects of the shock (e.g. a change in the systematic policy
response to those shocks).
Given our identi￿cation scheme, a variety of structural disturbances fall un-
der the broad heading of non-technology shocks, including exogenous monetary
23and ￿scal policy shocks or preference shocks, among others.22 A number of
authors have provided independent evidence pointing to a smaller volatility of
those shocks in the post-84 period, relative to the earlier period.23 That evi-
dence is consistent with our ￿nding of a smaller contribution of non-technology
shocks. Yet, and at least in the case of policy shocks, it can hardly be in-
terpreted as being consistent with the "good luck" hypothesis, at least to the
extent that the decline in the volatility of those shocks is viewed as the result of
a better understanding of the destabilizing e⁄ects of "erratic" policies. The key
role of non-technology shocks in accounting for the Great Moderation is also
consistent with the empirical literature on interest rate rules, which points to
an increase in the weight attached by the Fed to in￿ ation stabilization during
the Volcker-Greenspan years relative to the pre-Volcker period.24 To the extent
that the non-technology shocks identi￿ed by our VAR largely lead to changes
in aggregate demand with limited impact on potential output, a stronger anti-
in￿ ationary stance by the Fed should bring about greater output stability as
a by-product, in a way consistent with our evidence. Furthermore, and as
discussed in Gal￿, L￿pez-Salido, and VallØs (2003), the Fed￿ s greater focus on
in￿ ation stabilization should automatically lead to a greater accommodation of
changes in potential output resulting from technology shocks. That mechanism
could thus account for the stability in the contribution of technology shocks to
output volatility suggested by our estimates, even in the face of a likely reduc-
tion in the size of the underlying shocks.25 It is also consistent with conventional
22Of course, that diversity combined with changes in the relative importance of each of
the shock-types and the possible di⁄erences in their respective joint responses of output,
hours, and labor productivity could be an spurious source of some of the changes we detect.
Unfortunately there is little we can do to assess the quantitative relevance of that hypothesis
without imposing additional (and likely controversial) identifying assumptions. A further
limitation of our approach results from the underlying linear structure assumed, that implies
that small and large shocks generate the same conditional comovements and relative volatilities
among the variables of interest. Thus, some of the estimated changes in correlations could be
in principle caused by non-linearities combined with di⁄erences in the size of shocks across
periods. Unfortunately, and due to the reasons pointed out in the text, our identi￿cation
approach does not allow us to separately identify the size of the shocks and its changes over
time.
23See, in particular, section 5.4 in Stock and Watson (2002) and section 5.D in Smets and
Wouters (2008).
24See, e.g., Taylor (1999), Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2000) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006).
25Evidence of smaller technology shocks in the post-84 period can be found in Stock and
24accounts of the role played by the Greenspan Fed in accommodating the output
and employment boom during the second half of the 1990s, generally attributed
to the high productivity growth brought about by the IT revolution
How can one explain our second main ￿nding, i.e. the large decline in the
hours-labor productivity correlation conditional on non-technology shocks? One
way to approach this question is to consider what may have caused the high
and positive conditional correlation in the early postwar period. A common
explanation found in the literature is the presence of labor hoarding, under-
stood as ￿rms￿desire to smooth employment and/or hours hired in the face of
￿ uctuations in demand and output, possibly as a result of a variety of costs asso-
ciated with the adjustment of labor. In that environment, measured hours will
￿ uctuate less than their e⁄ective counterpart, since ￿rms will elicit procyclical
variations in (unobservable) e⁄ort.26 To formalize this idea let n￿
t = nt + et
where n￿
t and nt denote, respectively, e⁄ective and measured (log) labor input,
and et represents (log) e⁄ort. Suppose that, in the face of shocks that call for an
adjustment of e⁄ective labor input, ￿rms make use of both margins (hours and
e⁄ort) to a greater or lesser degree. For simplicity, let us assume that et = ￿ n￿
t,
where ￿ 2 [0;1] measures the extent to which changes in e⁄ective labor input are
achieved without adjusting measured hours (i.e. the extent of labor hoarding)
and ￿t is an i.i.d. disturbance uncorrelated with n￿
t. Assuming, for the sake of
illustration, a simple a production function (in logs) of the form
yt = at + (1 ￿ ￿) n￿
t + ￿t
where ￿t represents variations in non-labor inputs.27 Combining the previous
assumptions we obtain
yt = at +
￿
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿
nt + ￿t
yt ￿ nt = at +
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿
nt + ￿t
Watson (2002) and Smets and Wouters (2008), among others.
26See Sbordone (1996), Gal￿ (1999), and Barnichon (2006) for examples of structural models
generating such SRIRL as a result of variable e⁄ort.
27For simplicity we assume the latter to be independent of the degree of labor hoarding.
25In the above setup, a reduction in the degree of labor hoarding ￿ could
potentially account for three of our ￿ndings: (i) the increase in the volatility of
hours relative to output, (ii) the decline in the response of labor productivity
to a expansionary non-technology shocks, with an eventual switch in the sign of
that response (if ￿ becomes smaller than ￿), and (iii) the shrinking correlation
between hours and labor productivity conditional on non-technology shocks.
Given the nature of our empirical analysis, the previous explanations can
only be viewed as speculative. Establishing their relevance will require more
direct evidence (e.g. of a decline in labor hoarding practices in response to more
￿ exible labor markets) or the estimation of full ￿ edged DSGE models with time-
varying parameters (but at the cost of having a less ￿ exible framework relative
to the VAR).
An additional important limitation of our analysis is worth emphasizing:
We have not attempted to establish a causal relationship between some of our
￿ndings regarding patterns of second moments and the Great Moderation. In
particular, we have only pointed to a rough coincidence in time between the
decline in both output volatility and in the comovement of labor productivity
with hours, and have shown that those changes in second moments are largely as-
sociated to changes in the economy￿ s response to non-technology shocks and/or
in the relative importance of the latter￿ s contribution to ￿ uctuations. Determin-
ing whether both phenomena have a common underlying explanation, perhaps
related to the evolution of the labor market structure, is a challenging task that
remains beyond the scope of he present paper.
Those caveats notwithstanding, we believe that many of the ￿ndings re-
ported in the present paper may provide a useful reference for the evaluation of
alternative explanations of the Great Moderation. At the very least, our ￿nd-
ings should convey a clear message, namely, that changes in the macroeconomic
performance of the U.S. economy since the early 1980s, including the Great
Moderation, are far more complex than implied by some stylized versions of the
"good luck" hypothesis.
26Appendix
The present appendix describes the method used to estimate the time-
varying SVAR. Our approach follows closely Cogley and Sargent (2005), Prim-
iceri (2005), and Benati and Mumtaz (2007).
A. Priors
Let zT denote a sequence of z￿ s up to time T. We assume that the conditional
prior density of ￿
T is given by:
p(￿
Tj￿T;￿T;￿;￿;￿) / I(￿
T) f(￿
Tj￿T;￿T;￿;￿;￿) (5)
where I(￿
T) =
QT
t=0 I(￿t),
f(￿
Tj￿T;￿T;￿;￿;￿) = f(￿0)
T Y
t=1
f(￿tj￿t￿1;￿T;￿T;￿;￿;￿) (6)
and f(￿tj￿t￿1;￿T;￿T;￿;￿;￿) is consistent with (2). The function I(￿t) takes
a unit value if all the roots of the VAR polynomial associated to ￿t are larger
than one in modulus and 0 otherwise. To calibrate the prior densities of the
coe¢ cients we estimate a time invariant VAR using data up to 1961:IV. Fol-
lowing Benati and Mumtaz (2007) and Primiceri (2005) we make the following
assumptions about prior densities and parameters:
p(￿0) / I(￿0)N
￿
^ ￿OLS; ^ V (^ ￿OLS)
￿
p(log￿0) = N (log ^ ￿OLS;10 ￿ I)
p(￿0) = N (^ ￿OLS;j^ ￿OLSj)
p(￿) = IW
￿￿ ￿￿1;T0
￿
p(￿) = IW(￿ ￿￿1;2)
p(￿i;i) = IG
￿
0:0001
2
;
1
2
￿
where ^ ￿OLS is the vector of OLS estimates of the VAR coe¢ cients and ^ V (^ ￿OLS)
the estimates of their covariance matrix using the initial sample, ^ ￿OLS is a vector
containing the elements of the diagonal matrix ^ D and ^ ￿OLS is the element
27(2,1) of the lower triangular matrix ^ F￿1, where ^ F ^ D ^ F0 = ^ ￿OLS, and ￿ ￿ =
0:005 ￿ V (^ ￿OLS), T0 is the number of observations in the initial sample, and
￿ ￿ = 0:001 ￿ j^ ￿OLSj.
B. Estimation
To draw realizations from the posterior density we use an MCMC algorithm
which works in an iterative way. Each iteration is done in six steps and consists
in drawing a subset of coe¢ cients conditional on a particular realization of
the remaining coe¢ cients and then using such a realization in the conditional
densities of the remaining coe¢ cients. Under regularity conditions and after
a burn-in period, iterations on these four steps produce draws from the joint
density.
￿ Step 1: p(￿
TjxT;￿T;￿T;￿;￿;￿)
Conditional on xT;￿T;￿T;￿;￿;￿, the unrestricted posterior of the states
is normal. To draw from the conditional posterior we employ the algorithm of
Carter and Kohn (1994). The conditional mean and variance of the terminal
state ￿T is computed using standard Kalman ￿lter recursions while for all the
other states the following backward recursions are employed
￿tjt+1 = ￿tjt + PtjtP
￿1
tjt+1(￿t+1 ￿ ￿tjt) (7)
Ptjt+1 = Ptjt ￿ PtjtP
￿1
t+1jtPtjt (8)
where p(￿tj￿t+1;xT;￿T;￿T;￿) ￿ N(￿tjt+1;Ptjt+1).
￿ Step 2: p(￿TjxT;￿
T;￿T;￿;￿;￿)
This is done following the same procedure described in Primiceri (2005).
Conditional on ￿
T ^ yt = xt ￿ A0;t ￿ A1;t xt￿1 ￿ ::: ￿ Ap;t xt￿p is observable.
We can rewrite our system of equations as F
￿1
t ^ yt = Dt￿t where ￿t ￿ N(0;I).
Conditional on ￿T we use the algorithm of Carter and Kohn to obtain a draw
for ￿t taking the above system as observational equations and (3) as unobserved
states equations. Given that the ￿t￿ s and the ￿t￿ s are independent across equa-
tions the algorithm can be applied equation by equation. However notice that
in the bivariate case we have one observable equation and one state.
28￿ Step 3: p(￿TjxT;￿
T;￿T;￿;￿;￿)
This is done using the univariate algorithm by Jacquier, Polson and Rossi
(2004) used in Cogley and Sargent (2005) (see Appendix B.2.5 of the latter for
details).
￿ Step 4: p(￿jxT;￿
T;￿T;￿T;￿;￿), p(￿i;ijxT;￿
T;￿T;￿T;￿;￿), p(￿jxT;￿
T;￿T;￿T;￿;￿)
Conditional on xT;￿
T;￿T;￿T all the remaining hyperparameters, under con-
jugate priors, can be sampled in a standard way from Inverted Wishart and
Inverted Gamma densities (see Gellman et al. (2001)).
We perform 30,000 repetitions, we discard the ￿rst 10,000 draws and we keep
one for every 20 of the remaining 20,000 draws to break the autocorrelations
of the draws. The densities for the parameters are typically well behaved. We
made many robustness checks for prior speci￿cations and the length of the chain
with the main results not being a⁄ected signi￿cantly.
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33Table 1. The Great Moderation
Standard Deviation
Pre-84 Post-84 Post-84
Pre-84 p-value
First-Di⁄erence
GDP 1.21 0.54 0.44 <0.01
Nonfarm Business Output 1.57 0.68 0.43 <0.01
BP-Filter
GDP 2.00 0.94 0.47 <0.01
Nonfarm Business Output 2.59 1.23 0.47 <0.01
Note: All variables transformed by taking the natural logarithm and ap-
plying the transformation indicated in the table (￿rst di⁄erence or band-
pass ￿lter). P-values correspond to a test of equality of variances across
the two subsamples based on the asymptotic standard errors of variance
estimates computed using an 8-lag window.(see, Priestley (1991), p. 327).
34Table 2. Changes in Volatility
Standard Deviation Relative Standard Deviation
Pre-84 Post-84 Post-84
Pre-84 p-value Pre-84 Post-84 Post-84
Pre-84
First-Di⁄erence
Output 1.57 0.68 0.43 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Hours 1.05 0.65 0.61 0.00 0.66 0.95 1.41
Productivity 1.00 0.61 0.62 0.00 0.63 0.89 1.44
BP-Filter
Output 2.59 1.23 0.47 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Hours 2.08 1.39 0.67 0.06 0.79 1.10 1.40
Productivity 1.18 0.68 0.57 0.01 0.45 0.55 1.21
Note: P-values correspond to a test of equality of variances across the two
subsamples based on the asymptotic standard errors of variance estimates
computed using an 8-lag window.(see, Priestley (1991), p. 327)
35Table 3. Changes in Cross-Correlations
First-Di⁄erence pre-84 post-84 change
Output, Hours 0.78 0.57 ￿0:20
(0:08)
￿￿
Hours, Productivity 0.18 -0.41 ￿0:59
(0:10)
￿￿
Output, Productivity 0.75 0.50 ￿0:24
(0:11)
￿￿
BP-Filter pre-84 post-84 change
Output, Hours 0.89 0.86 ￿0:02
(0:09)
Hours, Productivity 0.18 -0.46 ￿0:65
(0:15)
￿￿
Output, Productivity 0.61 0.03 ￿0:58
(0:19)
￿￿
Note: Test of equality of correlations across the two subsamples based
on the asymptotic standard errors of estimated correlations computed
using an 8-lag window.(see, e.g., Box and Jenkins (1976), p. 376). One
asterisk denotes signi￿cance at the 10 percent level. Two asterisks indicate
signi￿cance at the 5 percent level.
36Table 4. Changes in Conditional Volatility
Non-Technology Shocks Technology Shocks
Pre-84 Post-84 Post-84
Pre-84 p-value Pre-84 Post-84 Post-84
Pre-84 p-value
First-Di⁄erence
Output 1.18 0.56 0.48 0.00 0.46 0.47 1.01 0.91
Hours 0.78 0.59 0.76 0.12 0.39 0.22 0.56 0.00
Productivity 0.53 0.17 0.33 0.00 0.68 0.93 0.88 0.51
BP-Filter
Output 1.97 1.17 0.59 0.07 0.59 0.49 0.83 0.43
Hours 1.60 1.29 0.81 0.40 0.57 0.32 0.56 0.04
Productivity 0.50 0.25 0.51 0.03 0.80 0.67 0.84 0.40
Note: P-values correspond to a test of equality of variances across the two
subsamples based on the asymptotic standard errors of variance estimates
computed using an 8-lag window.(see, Priestley (1991), p. 327)
37Table 5. Changes in Conditional Correlations
Non-Technology Shocks Technology Shocks
pre-84 post-84 change pre-84 post-84 change
First-Di⁄erence
Output, Hours 0.93 0.95 ￿0:02
(0:10)
-0.27 -0.65 ￿0:37￿￿
(0:11)
Hours, Productivity 0.61 -0.30 ￿0:93
(0:15)
￿￿ -0.75 -0.83 ￿0:07
(0:06)
Output, Productivity 0.85 -0.01 ￿0:87
(0:17)
￿￿ 0.83 0.96 0:12
(0:02)
￿￿
BP-Filter
Output, Hours 0.98 0.98 ￿0:01
(0:12)
0.06 -0.33 ￿0:40
(0:23)
￿
Hours, Productivity 0.67 -0.57 ￿1:24
(0:14)
￿￿ -0.66 -0.73 ￿0:06
(0:13)
Output, Productivity 0.80 -0.41 ￿1:21
(0:16)
￿￿ 0.69 0.89 0:19
(0:09)
￿￿
Note: Test of equality of correlations across the two subsamples based
on the asymptotic standard errors of estimated correlations computed
using an 8-lag window.(see, e.g., Box and Jenkins (1976), p. 376). One
asterisk denotes signi￿cance at the 10 percent level. Two asterisks indicate
signi￿cance at the 5 percent level.
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